As a component of the review, the Pentagon is considering adjusting the way Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger pay is allocated across the armed forces.

This review raises the more fundamental issue of whether military personnel are being adequately compensated for the fatality risk they assume in combat zones. If not, how should the Pentagon adjust compensation to more accurately reflect these risks?

The current policy provides a uniform danger pay premium of $225 per month to military personnel deployed into areas designated as a combat zone. This rate has been the same since 2003 because it is not indexed to inflation.

In addition to danger pay, soldiers are entitled to a special tax benefit known as the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, or CZTE. This benefit exempts military personnel from paying income tax on any income earned while in a combat zone.

Notably, previous research has shown the CZTE costs the U.S. government approximately 4.5 times more than regular danger pay. Because the current danger pay system is tied more to the person’s income than the level of risk exposure, the major beneficiaries of the current system are high-ranking officers, who reap the preponderance of the tax benefits.

But high-ranking officers do not bear a disproportionate share of risk. The data indicates enlisted personnel have higher fatality rates in comparison to officers.

For reference, throughout the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to 2021, enlisted personnel, who represent 82% of the total active duty force, accounted for 90% of all fatalities.

And the distribution of fatalities becomes even more skewed at the lower ranks. For example, the ranks of E-5 — equivalent to sergeant — and below account for 72% of the fatalities while representing 59% of the total force.

The main takeaway from the data is that fatality risks are much higher for junior personnel compared to high-ranking officers, who secure the lion’s share of financial benefits under current compensation policy.

This is in direct contrast to guidance provided in the economics literature and government practices, which indicate that valuations should be based on the level of the risk, not the person’s income.

There are also widespread differences in fatality risks across job types. Previous research has shown the average fatality rate for all military personnel increases by 45 per 100,000 when they are deployed into combat zones in comparison to stateside personnel. For reference, the yearly fatality rate for typical workers in the U.S. is around 3 per 100,000.

This number increases dramatically, however, for certain high-risk jobs, such as infantry and special forces operators — commonly grouped together and known as “combat” job specialties. Compared to stateside troops, military personnel in combat jobs increase their fatality rate by 181 per 100,000 when deployed into combat zones.

Most troops, therefore, see an increase in a probability of death, though there are major differences depending upon military occupational specialties.

These distinctly different outcomes should prompt us to compensate military personnel accordingly. Calculating the appropriate compensation levels can be addressed by utilizing estimates from the value of a statistical life, or VSL, literature.

The basic concept of the VSL is grounded in the idea that individuals often make every day tradeoffs between wealth or income and fatality risks. For example, people are generally willing to pay more for safer vehicles or higher quality medical care. Likewise, workers often demand higher salaries in riskier professions, ceteris paribus.

The most up-to-date estimates indicate an average American is willing to pay roughly $130 for every 1 per 100,000 reductions in fatality risk. Dividing the willingness-to-pay estimate by the reduction in fatality risk leads to an approximate value of $13 million per statistical life. This is the value that economists use in benefit-cost analyses for government programs intended to save lives or compensate fatality risk levels.

In the case of military personnel, analysts can combine the increased fatality risk levels for deployment into combat zones with standard VSL estimates to more precisely set appropriate danger pay rates.

Using this method, the most recent estimates suggest the average military danger pay should be $1,056 per month (in 2024 dollars). For combat job types with higher fatality risk, this amount balloons to $4,245 per month.

We have several policy recommendations for more accurately adjusting the current danger pay system. First, we should eliminate the CZTE and reallocate those cost savings to alternative pay methods. The primary reason is that the CZTE is not directly related to fatality risk, but rather correlates with higher ranks or income for military personnel.

Next, we recommend reallocating CZTE funds to increase the current danger pay of $225 per month to $1,056 per month for all military personnel. This amount should be tax exempt and indexed to inflation.

Finally, we recommend providing a new “extreme” danger pay category to military personnel who serve in high-risk occupations. The extreme danger pay category should be allocated primarily to infantry soldiers and special forces operators and set at $4,245 per month.

We realize these recommendations and adjustments to danger pay do not come without tradeoffs. The reallocation of funds would mean high-ranking officers in lower risk job types would essentially be taking a pay cut when compared to the current compensation system.

In contrast, low-ranking enlisted personnel in high-risk job types would receive a pay increase. We believe this adjustment is justified based upon the fatality risks seen in the most recent conflicts and the types of personnel taking on those risks.

Given new pay directives in the QRMC are set to be released early next year, the time to act is now.

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. government or any other institution with which the authors are affiliated.

Thomas J. Kniesner received a PhD degree in economics from The Ohio State University. He is a research fellow at IZA and Krisher Professor of Economics Emeritus at Syracuse University, where he served as chair of the Department of Economics. In 2013 Kniesner joined the faculty of Claremont Graduate University, where he has been university professor, senior research fellow, and chair of the Department of Economic Sciences.

Ryan Sullivan received a PhD in Economics from Syracuse University. He is an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he has taught a variety of topics related to cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, marginal reasoning, budgeting, finance, and labor economics. He served as a soldier in the U.S. Army National Guard from 1998 to 2006.

W. Kip Viscusi is Vanderbilt’s first university distinguished professor, with tenured appointments in the Department of Economics, the Owen Graduate School of Management and the Law School. Viscusi was previously the Cogan Professor of Law and Economics and director of the Program on Empirical Studies at Harvard Law School. He has also been the Allen Professor of Economics at Duke University and professor of economics at Northwestern University.

Since 2000, the DOD has spent more than $15 trillion dollars and has an anticipated budget of more than $900 billion for fiscal 2025. The DOD is the world’s single-biggest purchaser of bulk fuel, the largest employer on the planet with 3.4 million combined civilian and service members, and one of the largest health care providers in the world. The institution manages $3.8 trillion in assets that includes a 26 million-acre real estate portfolio and over 4,800 sites that can be found in every U.S. state and over 160 countries. The DOD’s budget ranks it as the 20th largest GDP in the world, ahead of countries like Switzerland, Poland and Taiwan.

Despite the immense scale of economic complexity managed and notable efforts in recent years to become a more versatile and active market participant, there is still a critical component missing to help this financial colossus better understand and improve its business dealings in an era of great power competition: a chief economist.

The DOD benefits from specialized staff members at all levels, with expertise in acquisitions, finance, health care, policy, intelligence, information technology and engineering. There are even a number of professional economists supporting smaller offices, such as the Investments & Economic Analysis team under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD A&S), the Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis within the Air Force, and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.

While most of these specialties are naturally reflected in the senior-most ranks of the department, the role of chief economist is noticeably absent among them. This absence is made even more prominent by the fact that various other federal agencies like the Department of State (DOS), Department of Agriculture (USDA) and even U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) all have a chief economist.

Although DOS, USDA and USAID manage only 4% of federal budgetary resources — compared to the DOD’s 14.7% — few would question their need for a chief economist when reflecting on some of their core responsibilities: DOS must understand the economic posture of countries around the world to monitor international conditions and negotiate balanced foreign policies; USDA must carefully watch resources and pricing dynamics to identify potential disruptions in critical food supply chains; and USAID must identify where aid-based interventions are necessary and assess how successful those interventions have proven to be. Meanwhile, the DOD must perform substantially similar duties (albeit in a different context) while also managing a much broader set of operational, technical, logistical, financial and administrative tasks to meet its strategic objectives.

Whether it’s highly specialized components destined for a $102 million F-35 fighter jet or a $13 billion Ford-class aircraft carrier, cloud servers that will form the backbone for JADC2, uniforms necessary to equip service members for duty, traditional materials like copper used to produce munitions or the scores of more exotic minerals deemed critical to defense needs, the DOD consumes vast amounts of goods both directly and indirectly. All of these goods are affected by complex interactions between energy production, commodity pricing, component manufacturing, systems integration, labor policies, FX fluctuations, inflationary pressures and any number of related economic variables. At scale and over time, such interactions can have a profound, compounding impact on the DOD’s ability to moderate its consumption of resources and maintain productive relationships with the vendors who provide them.

Tracking, analyzing and forecasting these economic dynamics takes on even greater importance in the face of an evolving definition for asymmetric warfare and under the pressure of time and cost overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. Indeed, the DOD recently issued its first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy, which includes the key priorities of building resilient supply chains, ensuring workforce readiness, establishing flexible acquisition processes and exercising economic deterrence against adversaries. The creation of a chief economist to work in coordination with other senior leaders like USD A&S and the comptroller is a logical next step toward implementing that strategy.

While the introduction of any new executive roles or organizational components should not be taken without thoughtful consideration of the long-term costs and bureaucratic implications, the relatively small action of creating an Office of the Chief Economist within the Office of the Secretary of Defense would, by definition, help the DOD spend more efficiently, manage resources more effectively and ultimately wield the full weight of its market power in a more productive manner. The opportunity gain produced can, in turn, have a truly positive and outsized impact from the DOD level down to service members and back to the American taxpayer.

As the saying goes, it’s common sense to care about dollars and cents.

David Rader is the former deputy director of Global Investment and Economic Security at the Department of Defense.

Adam Papa has extensive experience as a technology and national security professional, including experience as a deep-tech VC investor, NATO international staff member, McKinsey consultant, CFR term member and policy researcher at the Harvard Belfer Center.

For the military’s enlisted leadership ranks, being a “good guy” NCO who prioritizes popularity over the difficult but necessary decisions required for the success of their units face a variety of pitfalls.

The drive to be well-liked is an innate human inclination, yet for some NCOs, it becomes a dominant force that skews their judgment. “Good guy” NCOs tend to shy away from difficult conversations, choosing to maintain harmony at the expense of accountability. This approach, while seemingly benign, can severely undermine the effectiveness of leadership. Without accountability, standards within the unit inevitably decline, leading to a cascade of negative outcomes.

True leadership involves navigating the often uncomfortable terrain of decision-making that may not always be popular. Leaders must find a delicate balance between caring for their people and ensuring the success of the mission. While it is important to consider the well-being of subordinates, decisions that benefit the team in the long run must take precedence, even if they are not immediately well-received.

Compromised standards pose a significant threat to military effectiveness. When leaders prioritize popularity over enforcing rigorous expectations, they inadvertently create an environment where mediocrity is tolerated, and dangerous mishaps can flourish.

This erosion of standards can have far-reaching consequences, impacting not only morale and discipline but also the overall success of the mission. In the military, where precision and reliability are paramount, low standards can lead to serious mishaps, jeopardizing both lives and critical equipment.

One of the most direct consequences of declining standards is the deterioration of unit competence. Effective leadership requires a steadfast commitment to maintaining high standards and fostering a culture of continuous improvement. However, the “good guy” NCO, in their reluctance to enforce these standards, hampers the development of a proficient and efficient team.

By avoiding the necessary rigor of repeated tasks until they meet the required benchmarks, these leaders fail to push their subordinates to achieve their full potential.

As standards decline, so too does unit pride and morale. A team that perceives a lack of commitment to excellence from its leaders is likely to experience a decline in collective spirit.

Service members want to be part of a winning unit—one that demands excellence and strives for success. When standards are lowered, the unit’s success diminishes, and with it, the pride that motivates individuals to work hard and make sacrifices for the greater good. High morale and a sense of belonging are intrinsically tied to the enforcement of high standards set by NCOs.

To counteract the pitfalls of “good guy” NCO leadership, several practical solutions can be implemented:

- NCOs should work to build mutual trust within the team to achieve effectiveness and respect. Trust is cultivated through clear communication—explaining the rationale behind tasks and connecting them to the overall mission. When subordinates understand the reasons for high standards, they are more likely to embrace them.

- More experienced leaders also play a crucial role by providing continuous leadership development. Effective leadership at all levels requires a commitment to fostering a culture that values competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, and the long-term success of the unit over short-term popularity. Leaders must internalize the belief that the success of the unit is their ultimate responsibility.

The key lesson is clear: effective leadership demands the courage to make decisions that may be unpopular but are essential for mission success.

The mantra “Don’t be nice, be helpful” encapsulates the ethos that leaders must adopt—a focus on balancing the needs of their people with the uncompromising standards necessary for excellence in the military.

Air Force Master Sgt. Nathan Jemar is a munitions systems craftsman with the 649th Munitions Squadron.

Federal government employees constitute a vital part of our military reserves, with up to 20% of the total one million reservists employed by the executive branch as civilians, according to a 2024 RAND report.

Congress enacted a “differential pay” statute to support federal workers called to arms. Under the differential pay law, employees — in this case, reservists — get paid their full (higher) salary from the federal government and do not have to incur a pay cut when they serve in uniform. Pursuant to the law, federal employees in the reserves are entitled to differential pay when “order[ed] to perform active duty in the uniformed services” in different scenarios, including “during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.”

Pending before the Supreme Court is Feliciano v. Department of Transportation, a case about the interpretation of the differential pay statute. The Department of Transportation (DOT) argues that the law should be construed narrowly by requiring reservists to demonstrate not only that their service was performed “during” a war or national emergency, but that it was also “connected” to such war or national emergency.

I have concerns with the government’s interpretation. By limiting which federal reservists are entitled to differential pay, DOT’s position will have detrimental financial effects on brave federal employees and their families.

I am speaking out because the agency I lead, the Office of Special Counsel, enforces the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) as it applies to federal employees. The purpose of USERRA is to protect military personnel from civilian employment discrimination and ensure that they get their jobs back after service as if they had never left. The law protects the non-military professional lives of those who serve by minimizing disadvantages to their careers and ensuring their prompt reemployment after deployment. The law also seeks to encourage uniformed service. Notably, Congress intends that the federal government be a “model employer” under USERRA in seeking to reacclimate military personnel to their civilian lives.

But caring for their return is only part of the job. It also matters that military personnel do not suffer financial hardship while they are serving. This is where the differential pay statute comes in. Designed to maintain the financial health of reservists, the differential pay statute seeks to ensure that workers called to arms are paid as much as they receive during their federal civilian employment — that is, that they don’t suffer a loss of income by serving. This view — shared by petitioners, members of Congress and veterans’ groups — is consistent with other laws designed to protect service members like USERRA. And it is something that many private companies already provide to their employees who serve.

For over 80 years, the Supreme Court has held that statutes concerning service members should be “liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation,” aiming to “benefit … those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need.” Under this canon, where statutes concerning reservists and veterans are open to multiple interpretations, they should be read “in the beneficiaries’ favor.”

Earlier this year, in Rudisill v. McDonough, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the canon’s continued vitality. Where the statute is “ambiguous, the … canon … favor[s]” the service member, the court concluded. In the present case (and much like the court’s approach in Rudisill), where the differential pay statute is possibly open to several interpretations, I believe it should be interpreted in favor of reservists — providing a more expansive view of the benefits afforded to them, not less.

Congress’s intent at the time the differential pay statute was enacted further supports this view. Sen. Richard J. Durbin, who co-introduced the underlying act in 2001 with then-Sen. Barbara Mikulski, encouraged Congress to “provide … reservist employees with financial support so they can leave their civilian lives to serve [the] country without the added burden of worrying” about the financial well-being of their families. “They are doing so much for us; we should do no less for them,” he said.

Sen. Mikulski added, “[W]e need to … close the gap between the income [reservists] are leaving behind and the country they are working to defend.”

In sum, the pro-military benefits canon and congressional intent lead me to the conclusion that the differential pay statute should be read to ensure that all civilian federal employee reservists who serve are granted differential pay whenever a war or national emergency is ongoing.

The federal government should not impose two different salaries on the same employee. If the Supreme Court does not rule in the federal employee’s favor, I urge Congress to act, again, to protect our service members and not add to their sacrifice.

Hampton Dellinger was confirmed by the United States Senate to head the Office of Special Counsel in March 2024. OSC’s military-related responsibilities include working with and protecting whistleblowing federal employees at the VA, DOD and other agencies, plus ensuring civilian workers’ reemployment rights are protected after their deployments and reserve duties are fulfilled.

While used to explain the removal of leaders to the public in the vaguest of terms, the military’s use of such boilerplate raises questions and concerns about leadership conduct, even as most military leaders conduct themselves in a way that honors their nation and oath.

Those misbehaving leaders who earn their loss of confidence are often akin to the myth of Icarus, flying too close to a metaphorical sun, emboldened by hubris and overconfidence, ignoring warnings before their careers crash.

And for service members and the public, the lack of transparency or even a full explanation for these military firings can significantly impact public trust in the military, affect morale and damage the integrity of military leadership.

Vague explanations often lead to assumptions and mistrust, which can damage organizational readiness while missing opportunities to address and prevent similar issues from occurring in the future.

When explanations are too general, they can create an environment where speculation and distrust thrive, undermining the confidence that service members and the public have in military leadership.

However, full disclosures of details might compromise sensitive information, disrupt legal processes, and create further disruptions.

Striking the right balance between transparency and discretion is key to maintaining public trust, ensuring accountability and protecting operational security.

Key areas of concern

Service member morale: Mutual trust is vital to executing effective leadership, as emphasized in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command. Mutual trust between leaders, staff and subordinates is essential to building effective, cohesive teams that are successful. When leaders are dismissed with a catchall “due to loss of confidence,” this trust is undermined, creating an environment of uncertainty and doubts about the command structure. Without mutual trust, even strong teams will be hindered by individual performance and overall readiness.

Public trust: According to a Reagan National Defense Survey, Americans’ trust and confidence in the military fell to 48% in 2022, a 22% drop from the survey’s 2018 findings. Although several factors contributed to this drop, 52% of respondents cited the performance and competence of uniformed military leaders as the reason for their decreased trust in the military.

When leaders are fired — and the reasons are vaguely reported — it can create the perception that the military is avoiding accountability, further eroding public confidence. Over time, this erosion can impact recruitment and retention, as young men and women will be deterred from joining an organization perceived as lacking transparency and accountability.

Operational readiness: Senior leaders, chosen through rigorous selection and training, are crucial decision-makers. As stated in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, effective leaders set the example, reinforce a culture of trust, establish a professional climate, and ensure their organization’s readiness. When a leader is fired, it can disrupt the organization’s readiness by creating confusion, lowering morale and eroding trust. New leaders will need time to take accountability, gain the trust of subordinates and provide a new vision for the organization, which can temporarily hinder the unit’s effectiveness.

Organizational integrity: The “Battalion Commander Effect” demonstrates how the integrity and leadership of senior leaders directly shape the performance and culture of their units. Leaders must acknowledge their role in shaping the organizational climate, understanding that, whether implied or explicit behavior, impacts the behaviors of others and defines the organization’s culture.

Firing senior leaders without clear justification or explanation can disrupt ongoing training and missions, leading to delays, confusion, and lack of direction. Such disruptions impair the operational effectiveness as well as the overall integrity of the organization.

Recommendations for improvement

Targeted solutions can be implemented to address the challenges posed by vague dismissals of senior leaders and their impact on morale, public trust, operational readiness and organizational integrity.

Centralized bulletin for dismissals: Establish a centralized, national-level bulletin that concisely summarizes the dismissal or disciplinary action for field grade officers (CW3-CW4, O-4 and above) and senior non-commissioned officers (E-7 and above). This bulletin would look like other disciplinary blotters that identify service members and their actions while respecting the individual’s rights and due process. Implementing this allows leaders to restore mutual trust within the military, increase confidence in leadership and ensure clear accountability and expectations are communicated effectively.

Standardized dismissal process: Introducing a structured process for capturing and categorizing leadership dismissals is another recommendation to address how the military communicates about leadership changes.

A structured approach formally captures the circumstances of the dismissal and categorizes them (for example, misconduct, poor performance, leadership failure, disciplinary issue) into a more effective dismissal statement.

This communicates transparently that can meet the needs of the public. Internally, the affected unit should be provided with additional details explaining the situation to mitigate uncertainty and speculation while maintaining the trust and confidence of leadership.

Ethics accountability training: To have a high-performing team, there must be accountability, or simply leaders taking ownership of their decisions, while addressing and solving problems in their formations. Implementing an ethics and accountability seminar or instruction that includes lessons learned from past dismissals can help mitigate future dismissals.

In addition, providing leaders with such tools and strategies can reinforce ethical behavior and leadership. By integrating these components, this solution can help foster a culture of accountability, learning, and growth individually and throughout the organization.

As Simon Sinek writes in “Leaders Eat Last,” leadership isn’t about being in charge — it’s about taking care of those in your charge. True leadership requires not only accountability but clear and transparent communication.

While it may be challenging to fire a senior leader, it is important to be clear and transparent throughout the process to balance the individual’s rights and due process with the organization’s need to sustain trust, morale and operational effectiveness. When vague statements are made, they erode the confidence of service members and the public, disrupt operational readiness, and damage organizational integrity.

By adopting targeted recommendations, the military can enhance communication, bolster trust and ensure that leadership changes contribute positively to organizational health and effectiveness.

Capt. Jakob Hutter is a Kansas Army National Guard logistics officer currently serving as the Battalion S3 for the 169th Division Sustainment Support Battalion in Leavenworth, Kansas.

Hutter also serves as a troop command brigade training officer. He has a Master’s of Science degree in Organizational Leadership and received his commission from Kansas State University in 2016.

In a full-blown war with Iran, these existing bases will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack. The Iranians can see this and have created a large and very capable missile and drone force in part to exploit this situation.

Therefore, we need to reexamine where we are based in the region, both on a day-to-day and contingency basis.

Navy warships helped take down Iran’s attack on Israel, Pentagon says

Our presence at existing bases provides an important assurance mission to host countries. Thus, we are unlikely to permanently leave bases like Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates and Al Udeid in Qatar.

We should, however, work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Egypt to identify bases as far to the west as possible where we can deploy aircraft, maintenance capabilities, refueling capabilities and weapons.

We have already done some of this work. The “Western Basing Network” was a joint U.S.-Saudi decision to evaluate bases near the Red Sea for use in times of war. Not as far advanced but still under consideration were basing concepts that included Oman, Egypt and Jordan. The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid has also shifted some of its responsibilities to locations in the United States, significantly reducing air command and control vulnerabilities.

How does this approach, known as “agile combat employment,” work? Based on warnings and indications of war, land-based air assets would relocate to the western bases from their locations along the Arabian Gulf. The number of Iranian weapons that could reach them would be significantly reduced, warning times would be increased and the Iranians would have a targeting problem in ascertaining from which bases U.S. aircraft operated.

In the event of hostilities, these aircraft would launch from the distant bases, be refueled en route and conduct combat operations over Iran. Depending on how the fight was going, they could land and refuel/rearm at the existing forward bases on the Arabian Gulf, minimizing their time on the ground, and increasing their “cycle rate.” Regardless, they would return to the western bases to “bed down.”

However, access to these installations is not guaranteed. The necessary political decisions are not necessarily made quickly in this region. The facilities themselves range from “bare bones” bases to fully equipped ones. Nonetheless, this is something that is squarely in the best interest of all concerned.

There is a second component to this new basing construct, and it is the opportunity made possible by Israel’s 2021 entry into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is now possible to consider basing in Israel in the event of a war with Iran. It has the same geographic advantages as basing in western Saudi Arabia or other Arab states. Additionally, Israel has a powerful, proven air and missile defense capability. The fact that Israel is now in CENTCOM also facilitates training, interoperability, and even maintenance. Israel should certainly be at the forefront of possible basing alternatives.

The third component to the basing solution also involves Israel, and it is the growing normalization of ties with Arab states. This was made diplomatically possible by the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. It was made operationally feasible by Israel’s move into the CENTCOM AOR. It was further underwritten by Iranian malign behavior which has finally convinced the Gulf States that a collective approach to air and missile defense is necessary, practicable and achievable without sacrificing sovereignty. It is largely a matter of sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures and agreeing what sensor information to share, and how to share it, with the U.S. acting as the honest broker.

We have a clear-cut example of this concept at work. The Iranians’ large, complex attack against Nevatim Airfield in Israel on April 13, 2024, failed because of Israeli competence, U.S. and allied assistance and the cooperation and assistance of Arab neighbors. Information was shared; airspace was shared. In every measurable way, this was a remarkable success story.

Deterrence must be continuous; in the Middle East, it can have a very short half-life unless it is refreshed systematically. The events of the past two months clearly show that Iran can be deterred from undertaking irresponsible and deadly attacks in the region, but this requires resources, careful messaging and the demonstrated ability to fight and win if necessary.

We now need to move aggressively to develop basing alternatives that demonstrate that we are prepared to fight and prevail in a sustained, high-intensity war with Iran. Geography is destiny for some, but not for all. Being obviously ready to rebase rapidly, and frequently exercising the capability, will increase the chances of peace in the region, because Iran will be watching.

Gen. McKenzie, a retired U.S. Marine general, served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2019 to 2022. He is the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and author of “The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.”

Having managed the U.S. Air Force’s manpower and personnel portfolios, I understand the need to make difficult budgetary decisions, and I understood when we sometimes had to prioritize modernization and operational capabilities over legitimate people needs.

However, it is disheartening to hear decision-makers downplay and dismiss a clear priority — the fair compensation of our junior enlisted service members — when the real issue is insufficient funding and not a lack of need. Our junior enlisted personnel play a critical role in safeguarding our nation’s security, and their strategic importance in maintaining a strong, capable and ready force must remain a top priority.

Decision on junior enlisted pay boost not expected until November

In this context, the April 2024 report from the bipartisan Quality of Life (QOL) Panel for the House Armed Services Committee, led by Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., and Rep. Chrissy Houlahan, D-Pa., becomes particularly significant.

The report highlighted the substantial financial difficulties faced by junior enlisted members and made clear the need to improve their financial well-being to address systemic challenges that affect recruitment, retention, family stability and overall force readiness. The panel recommended a 4.5% pay raise for all service members and an additional 15% increase for those ranked E-1 to E-4.

The Military Officers Association of America and fellow military advocacy organizations embraced the move to support these young service members. But despite compelling evidence, opposition from the White House, DOD and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle dismissed these recommendations. Critics framed the issue as a false dilemma between funding new weapons systems or increasing pay, instead of making the case that both might be necessary.

Some examples of the flawed rationale:

• Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation: Some argued any pay raises should wait until the next Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) report is released. But QRMC members informed the QOL Panel’s findings, and waiting means no additional support for these families for years — likely until 2027.
• Pay compression: Others asserted a targeted raise would compress pay for midcareer personnel — in other words, service members would no longer receive appropriate financial reward for reaching beyond the junior pay grades. This argument failed to mention compression already exists within the current pay table at both the E7-to-E8 levels and E1-to-E3 levels with little impact. This argument also leaves out other components of full military compensation. Under the new tables, for instance, an E-4 with four years of service would receive an 8% pay raise when considering all base pay and allowances, which falls within the Society for Human Resource Management-recommended 7-12% pay increase when receiving a promotion.
• External factors: Critics have also suggested the pay raise wouldn’t solve recruitment and retention challenges. While pay is clearly not the only issue impacting recruiting, 51% of potential recruits cite pay as a primary factor influencing their decision to enlist. As for retention, with unemployment among junior enlisted spouses 10% higher than all other military spouses and DOD data showing up to 25% face food insecurity, junior members who have little or no economic margin for error can be forced to consider leaving the services as they stretch their income to make ends meet.

‘Generational investment’

Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, rightly points out the need for a “generational investment” in the military to meet rising threats. A pay adjustment for junior enlisted personnel should be part of this broader investment, not an either-or choice.

The most junior of our uniformed services will carry the heaviest burdens for our nation in the years ahead. Investing in them now is essential. While the pay raise targeted by the QOL Panel would be well-deserved, I understand the full 19.5% increase might not be possible given the many priorities our nation must address. But ignoring and dismissing the clear indicators of need, doing nothing or simply deferring action should not be an acceptable option.

As Congress reconciles its annual National Defense Authorization Act, the Military Officers Association of America urges lawmakers to show the same dedication to those who serve as these individuals have shown to our nation and authorize additional funding at a level that makes a difference for those who we depend on and need the most.

U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Brian T. Kelly (ret.) is the president and CEO of the Military Officers Association of America, which advocates on behalf of all who serve and have served, their families and their survivors, regardless of rank or branch of service.

Veterans need and deserve an electronic health records system built in the 21st century. This system should improve communication and coordination among health care providers to ensure better care. Whether it’s a primary care physician, a specialist or a mental health counselor, all members of the health care team need access to read and update a veteran’s records in real-time.

Despite billions of dollars pledged and already spent to overhaul the system, the majority of veterans’ health records are still stuck in an antiquated system.

In 2017, Congress allocated $16 billion to build and implement a modern electronic health records system across the Department of Veterans Affairs’ vast structure of 170 medical centers. The stated goal remains to replace the VA’s outdated, expensive system with a technologically advanced system that can directly and seamlessly interact with the Defense Department’s worldwide system.

The VA has been working to implement the new system for seven years, but it is only operational in six of the VA’s 170 medical centers. At the same time, the DOD now has its new health records system fully deployed worldwide.

Once this crucial project is complete, veterans’ health records can be securely stored and accessed on one platform from the day they enter a military entrance processing station through the entirety of their military service and transition into veteran status. Every medical record can be stored and accessed in the same way no matter where in the world they find themselves. For babies born in military hospitals, this could include records from cradle to grave.

The VA has spun its wheels for seven expensive years, trying to modernize and catch up to DOD. Until that happens, these two systems cannot “talk” to each other. A communications crater continues to exist.

The overly cautious delays must end. Aggressive, focused deployments are needed by regional systems rather than just by individual medical centers. The VA’s 170 medical centers are organized into 18 regional systems, known as VISNs. Each VISN has its own director and executive staff overseeing about 10 VA medical centers. Deploying to a full VISN would more than double what it has been able to do so far.

The DOD’s worldwide rollout of its electronic health records system was also phased, but it was much more aggressive in scope, putting the system online across Europe in one phase.

Now, election-year political theater could threaten further delay or even the unthinkable: abandoning this necessary project altogether. Lawmakers are understandably frustrated by the lack of progress and apprehensive to continue appropriating tax dollars. AMVETS appreciates that the House and Senate Veterans’ Affairs committees take seriously their duty to provide oversight and ensure tax dollars are put to good use.

AMVETS urges lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle to demand progress and an aggressive rollout in the immediate future and to visit the sites themselves as implementation takes place.

But political speeches and threats of pulling the proverbial plug are counterproductive. Every lawmaker in both congressional chambers must share the nonpartisan position that this system must be successfully brought online systemwide.

Failure cannot be an option.

The vast majority of VA’s 9.1 million patients are still in the dangerously outdated 46-year-old Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture system (VistA). VistA costs about a billion dollars a year to maintain. It isn’t nearly as stable as it needs to be to safely house such important, sensitive records.

The Pentagon is rightfully proud of the DOD’s modern health records system, MHS Genesis, which was deployed over the past seven years with much fewer issues. The VA needs to work even closer with the DOD to make this happen as soon as possible.

Until the new system is running nationwide, we veterans remain stuck with uncertainty and dysfunction.

As the national executive director of AMVETS, one of the nation’s largest and most inclusive congressionally chartered veterans service organizations, I strongly encourage the VA to build upon its recent successes and move urgently to implement an aggressive deployment schedule to bring a modern electronic health records system to all veterans.

Through a resolution passed by AMVETS’ membership at its national convention in August, AMVETS formally urges Congress to ensure the VA is leading and taking swift action to implement a modern electronic health records system for veterans.

History affords few moments to change the dynamics of a situation. Now is that time. We must do better for veterans and their families.

Joe Chenelly is the national executive director of AMVETS, a Marine Corps combat veteran of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a former Military Times staff writer. Find him on X at @jchenelly.

Ukraine had wanted more. It has repeatedly sought permission to use U.S.-built Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles for long-range strikes deep in Russia. They have a range of up to 190 miles and, with their speed, are better able to hit mobile targets. Prior to Zelenskyy’s visit, there were hints the U.S. might provide Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM). Unlike ATACMS missiles, these missiles are abundant in the U.S. arsenal, and their stealth capability make them more effective at hitting defended targets.

White House announces billions in new Ukraine aid, new F-16 training

Sentiment in NATO is growing to give Ukraine more scope for action. This month the European Parliament asked European Union members to “immediately” lift deep strike restrictions, and so have top U.S. House Republicans and several leading congressional Democrats. Nonetheless, the U.S. approach remains hesitant.

There may be risks. On Sept. 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned an attack on Russia by a state backed by a nuclear power could lead to a nuclear response. He often cries nuclear wolf, but this time, his timing suggested worry that Biden might cave to pressures and unleash Ukraine to conduct more deep attacks.

A Russian nuclear response, however, seems unlikely and would probably bring little, if any, military gain. Russian troops are not trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield, as in the Cold War. Ukraine has few, if any, concentrated, high-value military targets. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have warned Putin not to go nuclear, while Biden has warned of “catastrophic consequences” if he does.

There is also a risk that some JASSMs might miss their targets or not be fully destroyed. Russia — and China — could analyze the debris to try to learn more about their stealth capability and sensitive electronics.

Time and again when Ukrainian forces have surprised or shocked Russia — from destroying or damaging one-third of its Black Sea fleet to seizing territory in Russia’s Kursk region — the Kremlin’s response has been weak. Suffering steep manpower losses and needing arms from Iran and North Korea, Russian forces may face limitations.

To its credit, Ukraine is doing a lot on its own to strike deep inside Russia. On Sept. 18, it carried out a stunning attack in Russia’s Tver region, blowing up a huge weapons depot in a blast akin to an earthquake. To overwhelm air defenses, Ukraine used over 100 slow-flying drones. The depot was 300 miles away from Ukraine, well beyond the 190-mile range of ATACMS missiles.

A welcome surprise has been Ukraine’s high-tech drone innovation. Former CIA Director General David Petraeus called it “unprecedented” in scale and pace. Even more is coming. Last month, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had deployed its first high-speed missile-drone, the Palianytsia.

But Ukraine needs more long-range strike power than its own aviation sector can provide. U.S. arms may be a valuable complement, despite their higher cost.

Last spring the U.S. began sending the long-range variant of ground-to-ground ATACMS missiles to Ukraine for use inside its territory. In occupied Crimea, they have ravaged Russia’s navy and air defenses and supporting infrastructure. ATACMS missiles are responsive and can hit mobile targets that elude drones. In June, the U.S. allowed Ukraine some added flexibility — to strike across the border inside Russia with ATACMS missiles wherever enemy forces were engaged in attacks.

On Sept. 26, Biden also promised to send hundreds more Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). Armed with them, Ukraine’s F-16s could shoot down some Russian combat aircraft in flight before they release devastating glide bombs.

The long-range strike mission is important for Ukraine, but so are other factors. It faces challenges in several areas, including a soldier shortage, inadequate defensive fortifications and uncertainties about future Western aid.

Nonetheless, the U.S. could benefit Ukraine by doing more to help it to conduct long-range strikes in Russia. Neither U.S. weapons nor Ukraine’s, by themselves, are enough. Together, they could raise the cost to Russia of its perfidy and help strengthen European security.

William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND research institution and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and a U.S.-Soviet commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher at RAND and a former military analyst with the Congressional Research Service.

While many thrive in service, we must grapple with the reality that too many military families, particularly junior and middle enlisted families, are experiencing food insecurity, defined as the inability to consistently afford or access adequate meals.

Food insecurity among military families unacceptable, advocates say

According to Military Family Advisory Network’s latest research, one in four (27.7%) active duty military families are food insecure compared to 13.5% of U.S. households. MFAN’s findings are consistent with the Defense Department’s own research, which found that 24% of service members experienced food insecurity in 2022.

While the military is a microcosm of the broader population, the unique challenges and lived experiences of service members result in disproportionate rates of food insecurity. The nuances and complexities of military life, including the consequences of financial hardship, lead many to skip meals or choose less nutritious options.

How is it that those who put country before self experience food insecurity at more than twice the rate of civilians? The answer may be traced to the unique demands of military life, most notably frequent moves.

Military families move every two to three years on average. During a permanent change of station, families undergo a complete reset. Many military spouses are forced to leave their jobs and find new employment opportunities. Families must also pay first- and last-month’s rent to secure their next home and stock up on household essentials while also navigating new doctors, schools, child care and community — all without the support of an extended network.

Simply put, this reset is taxing on both pocketbooks and overall well-being.

Policy efforts to address food insecurity in the military are underway, pointing to a significant step in reducing the stigma surrounding this issue.

The Defense Department’s Taking Care of Our People initiative seeks to strengthen economic security for service members and their loved ones. The basic needs allowance, a monthly payment for military families whose household income falls below 150% of federal poverty guidelines, has been rolled out force-wide.

Inflation has some military families ‘grasping at pennies’

In the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress instituted a 5.2% pay raise, the largest in more than 20 years. In 2023, basic allowance for housing rates were increased by an average of 12%. The House Armed Services Committee formed a special panel and introduced a 31-point plan in the fiscal 2025 NDAA to evaluate military policies and strengthen service members’ quality of life.

Lawmakers have also proposed legislation to reduce barriers to federal nutrition programs, like removing service members’ housing allowance from income calculations for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, more commonly known as SNAP or food stamps.

Yet, the issue persists. The reality is that policy changes take time and families struggling to make ends meet do not have the luxury of time.

This is when public-private partnerships and motivated citizens have the opportunity to fill the gap. For example, initiatives are emerging to help active duty military families who have recently moved stock their pantry, offset moving costs, screen for food support and connect with their new community.

As a nation, we owe an immense debt to those who serve. And this is not just a military issue — our national security impacts us all. Solving food insecurity is about more than putting food on the table; it is offering dignified support for those who sacrifice so much for our freedoms. We must give service members and their families every opportunity not just to get by but thrive.

Shannon Razsadin is the spouse of a recently retired service member and CEO of the Military Family Advisory Network. MFAN’s mission is to understand and amplify the needs of military-connected families and inspire data-informed change.

Dave Flitman is CEO of US Foods, a leading food service distributor and corporate sponsor of Military Family Advisory Network programming. With a son serving in the U.S. Army, Flitman is passionate about serving members and veterans of the U.S. military forces.

Congress is poised to adopt language in the annual National Defense Authorization Act that would override governors’ authority over National Guard units. Adoption would seriously damage our national security, imperil military readiness, and infringe upon longstanding gubernatorial authority over National Guard units.

The good news is Congress has an opportunity to change course.

Earlier this year, the Department of the Air Force submitted Legislative Proposal 480, which aims to circumvent federal law requiring governors to consent to any transfer of National Guard units out of their respective states.

The end goal is to take Air National Guard units performing space missions out of their states and forcibly integrate them into the U.S. Space Force. This override of established federal law raised serious concerns within the National Guard community and united the nation’s 55 state and territorial governors in opposition to it.

The governors’ position is noteworthy.

It is rare that leaders of contrasting regional, political, and geographical constituencies find common ground on an issue. Their April statement against LP480 is focused on the potential impact on more than 450,000 Army and Air Guardsmen.

We share the view of the governors that LP480 “disregards gubernatorial authorities regarding the National Guard and undermines over 100 years of precedent as well as national security and military readiness.”

Over the last century, units have moved from one state to another. Or, as happened after World War II, units were dissolved. However, in every case, those actions were taken with the consent of the affected governors as required by law. In all our discussions with proponents of LP480, we’ve yet to receive an explanation as to why the law should no longer apply.

The National Guard Association of the United States, along with our partners, spent the last six months trying to find a solution to the LP480 problem. We have attempted to work directly with the Department of the Air Force to find a mutually beneficial arrangement that would not erode decades of federal law and create a capability gap in our national security infrastructure. We have also informed Congress on the potential detrimental effects that LP480 would have on our national security, including data which shows most affected airmen will not join the Space Force. The loss of these highly trained professionals would be immense.

The concern about precedent is not irrational. Currently, the Air Force is developing its cyber capabilities, in part, relying on a new Air National Guard unit. The Army Guard has the 91st Cyber Brigade with units in more than 30 states.

If LP480 is approved, the path for the federal government to avoid obtaining governors’ consent is open. What could come next? How would we prevent moving a C-130 wing out of a state and putting it into the active component? Or taking a brigade combat team out of the Army Guard and putting that into the active component?

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall stated this is a “unique situation,” a one-off. Will the next secretary agree? Or another service chief? Readiness and force cohesion undoubtedly would suffer.

Furthermore, if those Airmen are moved into the Space Force, they lose access to State Partnership Program to support USSPACECOM/USSF priority security cooperation requirements.

At times, we have come close to reaching a compromise where there is a give and take on both sides of the disagreement. However, the intransigence and stubbornness of unelected Pentagon policymakers has prevented an amicable agreement from being reached. The good news is Congress has an opportunity to solve the problem with a consensus solution.

U.S., Rep. Joe Wilson, R-S.C., courageously led efforts to amend the House version of the NDAA, addressing the concerns of the governors and Guard community. This language preserves the authority of governors while also providing a potential pathway for a voluntary transfer of the Guard units in question. Most importantly, it will prevent any capability gaps in our national security infrastructure. Should both chambers of Congress adopt the House language in the final version of the bill, the problem will solve itself and take one of many tasks off the Congressional to-do list.

In addition to following the law and ensuring national security, Congress should also take note that the next presidential administration may not be in favor of LP480. Vice Presidential candidate Gov. Tim Walz is an opponent of LP480 and signed the letter against it earlier this year.

While Vice President Kamala Harris has not weighed in, it would be unwise for Congress to move forward with LP480 in its present form less than two months from election day. Additionally, former President Donald Trump is a supporter of establishing a Space National Guard – something which would be practically impossible should LP480 be adopted as currently written. We can all agree the next commander in chief should not be prevented from pursuing their vision for the armed forces before they are even sworn into office.

Secretary Kendall told The War Horse in a late May interview that the Air Force “can live with any result that comes out” of the debate over LP480. He added that if the Airmen with space missions “stay in the Air Guard, we’ll make that work.” Given an increasing reliance upon the Guard at home and abroad, we need to find a solution that recognizes the National Guard is an asset to our national security, not an impediment. Our soldiers and airmen continue to answer the nation’s call, just as they have done for centuries.

We urge the Senate to adopt the House version of the NDAA which maintains the governors’ authorities in accordance with longstanding law and also allows for the transfer of the units.

Frank McGinn is a retired Massachusetts Army National Guard major general and the president of the National Guard Association of the United States.

This will be challenging for many reasons, including the need for Congress to identify offsetting “pay-fors.” But without a solution, we are in danger of being unable to deliver on our commitment to our nation’s military heroes.

There are a number of reasons for the VA’s deficit. There is $3 billion tied to benefit expansion, but that leaves $12 billion for an increase in medical care. In a health system with a budget of more than $369 billion a year, there are certainly opportunities to improve efficiency and reduce waste, but a significant part of the deficit can be traced to the growth in veteran enrollment. Due to the eligibility changes enacted as part of the PACT Act, the VA has enrolled more than 740,000 veterans in the VA health administration in the past 24 months, a 33% increase from the previous two-year period.

Taking care of more veterans is a good thing, but the VA budget cannot expect unlimited growth without corresponding reductions in other parts of the broader health system. After all, when veterans receive their care from the VA, they are receiving less care from other government-sponsored programs and private health insurance companies. Those savings should be used to make up the VA’s operating losses, at least in large part.

The way to fix this problem is called “insurance subvention.” Subvention would allow for a structural change in reimbursement that aligns funding with the channels through which the care is delivered. The largest of these programs are Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare and Medicaid subvention would allow the VA to receive reimbursement from those programs when they care for a veteran who is also enrolled in Medicare or Medicaid.

Subvention does more than just align financial resources to the way care is delivered. Receiving payment for caring for patients with Medicare and Medicaid coverage will also orient VA leaders to improving access that invites further growth and to increasing performance and the quality of care to be competitive with other options for health care that veterans may have.

Medicare subvention is not a new idea. Decades ago, the Department of Defense completed a demonstration project with military retirees. At the VA, Medicare subvention was proposed in 1999, back when the VA’s budget was only $43 billion, but there was no political will to take this shift on.

As secretary of Veterans Affairs more recently, I sought to implement Medicare subvention to correct the misaligned resource allocation in the system, only to be blocked by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The financial actuaries at OMB worried that the program might reduce the Medicare trust fund’s financial sustainability, a politically sensitive topic.

Yet unless the structural issues of financing are fixed, the system continues to grow increasingly inefficient for taxpayers and leaves the VA without adequate funds to care for new veterans entering the system.

The VA already bills private insurers, as secondary payers, for veterans who seek care in the VA. However, the VA should consider switching from being the primary payer to becoming a secondary payer for veterans with private health insurance options. The key here is to ensure veterans are not penalized and do not incur any greater financial obligations than in the current system.

Insurance subvention is complicated and takes some political will. But not addressing this now, and pasting over the problem with another $15 billion taxpayer funded authorization, is simply kicking the can down the road and ultimately doing our veterans a disservice.

David Shulkin served as the ninth secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs in the Trump administration and as the VA’s undersecretary of health in the Obama administration.

Editor’s note: An earlier version of this op-ed misstated that Shulkin serves as executive vice president at Sanford Health; he does not. The op-ed was updated Sept. 18 to reflect this correction.

That follows, and at least partially contradicts, previous reporting from Reuters, and Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder could not provide clarity Thursday when asked.

A premature U.S. departure from Iraq that ignores the advice of military leaders and conditions on the ground risks repeating the mistakes of past withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan and catalyzing an ISIS resurgence.

Under the U.S.-Iraqi Higher Military Commission, the United States and Iraq have agreed to discuss a transition to a “new phase of the bilateral security relationship,” though it remains unclear what that relationship would look like and how the U.S. force presence in Iraq would be impacted.

While the details of the future U.S. military posture in Iraq remain murky, the consequences of a premature withdrawal are clear.

General Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, warned Congress in March that a withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition “would all but guarantee ISIS’ return if it occurred before Iraqi Security Forces were ready to stand on their own.”

Similar warnings were issued in 2011 before a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq that catalyzed a series of events that led to the establishment of the ISIS caliphate and forced American forces to return in 2014.

Kurilla, in his testimony, also reiterated that the U.S. force presence in Syria would be significantly impacted without a military presence in Iraq. In July, CENTCOM announced that ISIS was attempting to reconstitute and was on track to double its number of attacks in Iraq and Syria.

While the ISIS caliphate is defeated, ISIS the terrorist organization is not. Two recent raids by U.S. forces demonstrate the persistent threat of ISIS and the continued operational role of U.S. forces in the country.

On Aug. 29, U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted a partnered raid in western Iraq to disrupt and degrade ISIS’ ability to plan and conduct attacks “throughout the region and beyond,” according to a Central Command statement.

Fourteen ISIS fighters were killed, including ISIS senior leaders overseeing operations in in the region, and seven U.S. service members were injured.

Just days later, on Sept. 1, U.S. forces partnered with Syrian Democratic Forces to capture an ISIS leader who was helping ISIS fighters escape detention in Syria.

Meanwhile, Iranian proxies have attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria over 170 times since October, placing pressure on the Iraqi government to secure a U.S. withdrawal while putting American troops in further danger and detracting from their intended defeat-ISIS mission. A leading grand strategic goal of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to evict U.S. military forces from Iraq and Syria.

Some officials within the Iraqi government have pushed for the departure of the U.S.-led coalition, but the Iraqi Foreign Ministry delayed a formal announcement in August.

On Sept. 12, though, the Iraqi Defense Minister said that Iraq and the United States had reached an agreement to withdraw the majority of U.S. and coalition troops in two unspecified stages beginning this year and concluding in 2026 as part of a transition to a “sustainable security partnership.”

But a withdrawal of U.S. forces from non-Kurdish parts of Iraq could make Americans in Baghdad more vulnerable and cause concern among many Sunnis, creating fertile ground for ISIS radicalization, recruitment and resurgence.

A more complete American withdrawal that also included the departure of U.S. forces from Kurdistan would likely be a disaster, exacerbating Sunni concerns and making it much more difficult logistically for the Pentagon to support U.S. troops in Syria.

The warnings of military leaders and recent operations demonstrate the danger of an ISIS resurgence and the continued importance of U.S. forces in preventing such an outcome. But they are also a reminder that American service members continue to put themselves in harm’s way in Iraq and Syria waging a war that some Americans seem to have forgotten.

If the United States intends to keep U.S. troops in harm’s way to protect vital interests, Washington must ensure that our fellow citizens in uniform have the means to defend themselves and the permission to strike back with overwhelming force when they are attacked.

The United States must also ensure that its forces are operating with reliable partners and under a coherent strategy rather than conducting sporadic raids and airstrikes while its forces are subjected to regular attacks by Iranian terror proxies, including some militias that are part of the Iraqi security architecture.

The future U.S. military posture in Iraq remains uncertain. But if past is prologue, we can be confident that a U.S. military withdrawal that ignores conditions on the ground will not end well.

Cameron McMillan is a research analyst at FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power, where Bradley Bowman is the senior director.

While many aspects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resemble World War I — trenches, barbed wires, heavy exchanges of artillery — the innovative use of drones has been game-changing. Unmanned systems are altering the character of warfare, and the ongoing integration of AI and robotics will further accelerate this dramatic shift. It is why these were my top modernization objectives during my tenure as Army secretary and secretary of defense.

The potency of unmanned systems is most pronounced when it comes to small aerial drones — essentially robots — that are used today to conduct the same tasks that soldiers performed in the past: reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting and direct attack. But they do it far more efficiently and accurately. For instance, when I was a platoon leader decades ago, it typically took a couple infantrymen to destroy a tank at a max range of 3,750 meters. Today, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can do the same at far greater distances, with better success, and at much less cost.

To date, Ukraine has destroyed over 10,000 Russian vehicles, nearly one-third of which are tanks. Many of these were killed by UAVs. Ukraine has also had great success using unmanned surface vehicles to sink or damage a number of Russian ships in the Black Sea.

The introduction of drone swarms — think of dozens or hundreds of UAVs being employed simultaneously — will make the battlefield more lethal than ever before. From a production perspective, generating such a number is not an arduous task. At a gathering this summer of the Aspen Strategy Group that focused on AI, I co-led a panel discussion where one former U.S. official reported that Kyiv is acquiring well over 50,000 drones a month. The speed and cost at which the Ukrainians can do this compared to the United States is shocking.

As important, because the software on these drones is easily modified, Ukraine’s military can keep up with the changing threats and tactics of the modern battlefield. This is something many of our existing platforms, which are defined — and usually trapped in time — by their hardware, often cannot do. The good news is that this can be remedied with more investment in American innovation and process changes.

AI is also revolutionizing a wide range of administrative and logistical functions far removed from the front lines. It will do what AI does best: improve the speed, accuracy, cost and quality of decision-making. Artificial Intelligence can be used for preventive maintenance to reduce the likelihood of equipment breaking down during the fight; it can ensure the right supplies get to the right place at the right time; it can improve talent management in the force; transform supply chain risk management in the defense industrial base; and the use of large language models can hyperpower military staffs. This is the future for a broad range of ordinary military tasks, in addition to enhancing our warfighters’ effectiveness and survivability on the battlefield.

All this demands that DOD accelerate its across-the-board adoption of AI and advancement of robotics and autonomy. It is an asymmetric advantage the U.S. must master first and retain preeminence over. This means investing far more in these technologies, adopting commercial standards and processes as much as possible, capturing all the department’s data in a central repository, prototyping and testing far more aggressively and showing a willingness to deploy needed systems even when one’s confidence level is less than 100%. At the same time, the Pentagon must continue to do these things responsibly, beginning with the ethical principles for AI that I established in February 2020.

As the war in Ukraine rages on, we must heed the lessons from it and do everything in our power to ensure our military has the advanced AI, robotics and autonomy tools it needs to fight — and win — the battles of tomorrow. Doing so, and with a far greater sense of urgency, will serve us incredibly well in any future conflict; especially if we must face off against our greatest strategic threat today — a People’s Republic of China — with the world’s largest and most concentrated armed forces.

Dr. Mark T. Esper was the 27th secretary of defense and author of the New York Times bestseller, “A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times.” He is also a partner and board member in the AI venture firm Red Cell Partners.

My grandfather, Jesus Antonio Pena, was a World War II Army veteran and later worked at Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. He served 30 years as a civil servant on base as an electrician, which propelled our family into the middle class through his service. When my grandfather passed, life dealt me a tough hand. I have lived on my own since I was 15, working two or three jobs at a time to keep my head above water. When I was a half-credit away from graduating high school, I dropped out.

I always knew I was going to serve. I went to the Army recruiter first, and they turned me away because I didn’t have a high school diploma or a GED. My cousin, who was in the Navy, suggested I meet with a Navy recruiter. The thought never crossed my mind, as I didn’t know how to swim and had no interest in becoming a sailor. With a little convincing, I met with a Navy recruiter in San Antonio — that decision changed the course of my life. A few weeks later, I was pushed into the deep end of the pool and learned how to swim at Naval Station Great Lakes.

As a cryptologist in the Navy, I went on to serve five years in Iraq and Afghanistan and deployed throughout the Middle East and Asia. I received my high school diploma while stationed at NAS Pensacola, Florida, and my master’s degree while in service as I rose through the ranks from E1 to E9 as master chief petty officer.

The men and women I served with had their own life stories, but the common denominator that tied us together was our love of country. For young Americans who embody the spirit of patriotism, want to work hard, and answer a higher calling — the military is an excellent path with endless opportunities.

Unfortunately, our military is currently facing a recruitment and retention crisis. In fiscal 2023, three military service branches — the Army, Navy and Air Force — failed to meet recruitment goals.

As a master chief, I never judged my fellow sailors based on their race, religion, ethnicity, or other personal attributes. Merit rules the day and the drive to propel our mission forward is the most important aspect of the job. After all, I joined the Navy through a program that allowed individuals to enlist without a high school degree.

Earlier this year, the Navy announced that it is bringing back a similar program — opening the door for more young recruits to begin a career in the military. Through the addition of several new recruiting programs, the Navy was able to hit its recruitment goal for this year. I urge all service branches to consider a similar strategy.

That said, recruiting new service members is only half the battle. We must also focus on retaining the talent we already have in our military. Poor quality of life is a deciding factor in leaving any employer. Living conditions, access to healthy food, child care, housing maintenance and a lack of clean workspaces have pushed many talented service members to find other opportunities. The men and women who answered the call to serve deserve better initiatives to improve their quality of life.

As a member of the House Appropriations Committee, I have worked extensively to secure funding that will advance this goal for our veterans, service members and their families. One of the initiatives I have championed is an increase in the Family Separation Allowance, or FSA, from $250 to $400 per month. This vital change, enacted as part of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, represented the first increase in two decades for military families separated as a result of duty station assignments. This long-overdue adjustment ensures our military families receive the support they deserve during challenging times of separation.

Throughout our history, multiple generations of service members have joined the ranks to fight for our freedoms. I have not lost sight of the fact that pages of my story would have looked very different had I not been given the opportunity to enlist.

The Navy is the only service to date that has reopened the option to recruit those who lack a high school diploma but are otherwise qualified to join the service. For the sake of military readiness, I encourage all services to follow suit. You never know when the next recruit may become a leader in the service or walk the halls of Congress.

U.S. Rep. Tony Gonzales represents Texas’ 23rd Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives. Gonzales is the highest-ranked enlisted service member to ever serve in Congress.

To do so would irreparably damage the credibility of these countries, set back decades of progress towards better legal protection of civilians in armed conflict and betray the commitment to a rules-based international order which NATO countries and many others seek to defend, including in the current Russia-Ukraine conflict.

What is particularly unfortunate is that the authors argue for such a dramatic reversal without providing a facts-based analysis of the military effectiveness of cluster munitions, either historically or in the Ukraine conflict.

States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions banned such weapons both because of the unacceptable harm they consistently inflict on civilians and due to the inaccuracy, unreliability, and limited military effectiveness of these antiquated area weapons. They are, in effect, a crude weapon of the Cold War period with most existing stocks approaching or past their intended period of use.

Since their peak production period during the Cold War, a wide array of more accurate and reliable weapons has become available. While a weapon that can spread 600-700 submunitions over thousands of square meters represents impressive destructive capacity, the reality is that most of these submunitions don’t hit anything. The UK Defense Ministry’s June 2000 report “Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis” concluded that tens of thousands of British cluster submunitions had destroyed only a few dozen military objects and that “it would have been useful to have a capability to strike single vehicles more accurately,”

Similarly, a Dutch military representative in an April 2024 meeting in Oslo on explosive weapons stated that the Netherlands no longer has cluster munitions or other area weapons because it prefers munitions that will hit their targets directly.

A U.S. General Accounting Office report on the 1991 Gulf War concluded that cluster munitions significantly impeded military operations and “in some cases ground movement came to a halt because ground units were afraid of encountering unexploded ordnance.” In addition, they also killed or injured 100 US soldiers and another 100 clearance workers.

Following the 2003 Gulf War a “lessons learned” report by the U.S. Third Infantry Division, cited by Human Rights Watch, included cluster munitions among the “losers” of the war, asking pointedly, “Is the DPICM (cluster munition) a Cold War relic?” and reporting that commanders were “hesitant to use it” but “had to” in the absence of alternative weapons.

What is beyond a doubt is that the historically high failure rates of cluster munitions, from 5% to 40% depending on the model and age of munitions used, results in massive contamination for which civilians and their communities consistently pay the highest price. This lethal contamination is a result of the incredibly complex design of the munitions, deployment in the heat of battle at altitudes and airspeeds inconsistent with the design, and the decades-old age of most cluster munitions in existing stockpiles.

Failure rates are consistently higher than manufacturers claim, often due to the difference between failures under ideal testing conditions and those in the real world. In areas in which civilians and military are co-mingled, civilians inevitably are killed and injured due to the indiscriminate wide-area nature of cluster munitions.

Children, who are attracted by the small colorful canisters of unexploded submunitions, are common victims, along with civilians attempting to remove them to access the rubble of their homes, farmers attempting to remove them from their lands, and clearance personnel toiling for years to remove them from destroyed buildings, forests, hillsides, swamps, and agricultural areas.

According the 2023 Cluster Munition Monitor report, at least 95% of those killed or wounded by cluster munitions in 2022 were civilians, and children accounted for 71% of casualties from cluster munition remnants where the age was known.

The authors of the Defense News article not only welcome Lithuania’s regrettable decision in July 2024 to withdraw from the CCM but also call on NATO countries to resume production of cluster munitions. Such new production would be inconsistent with U.S. Defense Secretary Austin’s assurance in July 2023 that U.S. cluster munition transfers to Ukraine were but a “bridging capability” until production of other (presumably less objectionable) weapons picks up.

Do the authors really want to redirect European arms production away from more modern weapons to production of weapons that have been labelled a “Cold War relic”? In considering the authors’ misguided call for NATO States Party to the CCM to withdraw, European states should reflect long and hard about the grave implications of any such decision for the fabric of international humanitarian law, a body of norms built up over generations out of the rubble of the Second World War to better protect both civilians and combatants.

Despite hundreds of armed conflicts in past decades, no state has withdrawn from any of the key global treaties banning an entire category of weapons, from the landmark 1949 Geneva Conventions or their 1977 Additional Protocols. Respect for these norms has collectively prevented untold suffering in conflicts of past decades. A call to effectively dismantle any one of these conventions is unconscionable.

Heeding this call would also be a victory for Russia, further undermining the rule of law and creating dissent among NATO allies. Now is the time to recommit to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, not undermine it.

We therefore call on NATO States party to the CCM to deplore Lithuania’s decision to withdraw.

They must take the opportunity of the September 10-14 meeting of CCM States Parties in Geneva to call on Lithuania to suspend its withdrawal process and engage in dialogue with other States Parties, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society about the historic failure of cluster munitions and their unacceptable humanitarian impacts that led to the Convention in the first place.

Peter Herby is the head of Petersburg Partnerships, a consultancy on arms-related humanitarian issues based in Geneva. Previously he was head of the Arms Unit for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 1997-2012). In this capacity Herby played an instrumental role in public advocacy on cluster munitions from 2001 and led the ICRC’s team that negotiated the CCM in Dublin in 2008.

Tamar Gabelnick is Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), a global civil society coalition seeking an end the suffering caused by landmines and cluster munitions. Previously she was Policy Director of ICBL-CMC (2005-2015), where she participated in the negotiations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and led the coalition’ global advocacy work on convention implementation.

But within the Pentagon and the services, AI ambition does not match current budgetary realities.

And while more money is rarely the answer to every Defense Department shortcoming, militaries are what they buy.

As a former Chief of Naval Operations and former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who continues to participate in non-governmental dialogues in Asia, to include with China, I’ve followed China’s impressive military growth.

Chinese ships, aircraft, and technology are not as good as ours, but they are buying more and rapidly getting better. The dialogue agendas and discussions have also evolved, to include transformational technologies with AI top of mind. Unquestionably, as we move deeper into the AI modernization war, Beijing is buying in that space and doubling down.

Years ago, the Air Force and Navy began creating a new sixth-generation, AI-powered fighter jet to outpace the one China is developing.

That project subsequently split into two separate approaches — the F/A-XX for the Navy and the Next Generation Air Dominance System (NGAD) for the Air Force. Although one is launched from the land and one from the sea, they possess the same objective: to remain globally dominant in the air and to help the United States be the first nation to realize true AI-powered air warfare. The only way to do that is to create these two new AI warfighting systems.

But the Fiscal Responsibility Act that Congress passed last year has hamstrung the U.S. military budget. The Navy and the Air Force are now stuck. In March, the Navy delayed a full $1 billion of funding for its F/A-XX system. The Air Force forewarned that it, too, might soon need to make “tough decisions” about NGAD, including potentially ending the entire program.

That must not happen. China is already closing in on the United States’ militarily. Its new fighter system will be ready by 2035. If the U.S. does not advance fully, our air dominance will become jeopardized.

The AI race is on and shaping the future of warfare. The global military AI market is nearly $9 billion today and is expected to approach $25 billion by 2032. China and the malign countries in its circle want China to become the AI dominant player. Delaying or pausing America’s AI warfighting modernization initiatives like the F/A-XX and NGAD make that goal attainable.

Bold statements of commitment ring hollow when we re-phase or delay our transformational programs. Our deferred outcomes and lack of real urgency are pleasing to Beijing, which has set 2035 as the year China will complete its military modernization effort. The Pentagon, particularly the Air Force and Navy, must set their budgets to deliver these critical systems faster. Congress, in providing for the common defense, must enable these critical programs with funding needed to win the military AI race, because in warfare, there is no second place.

In many respects, China is already ahead. Beijing’s civil-military fusion approach is alive and well. The infrastructure, techniques, and processes that have made China the global manufacturing center of gravity also nurtures along rapid military delivery and improvement.

This is seen in the maritime domain. Between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), eclipsed the size of America’s Navy, and the gap continues to widen.

The Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that China’s shipbuilding capacity far exceeds that of the United States because of its significantly larger military and commercial shipbuilding industry. According to the Pentagon’s China power report, the PLAN grew by 30 ships last year, while the U.S. added just two. That trend will likely continue as we’ve reduced our submarine buys in 2025 and delays plague our other shipbuilding programs.

The U.S. Air Force isn’t faring much better. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in march, Navy Adm. John Aquilino, then the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, assessed that “the world’s largest Navy [is] soon to be the world’s largest Air Force” and “the magnitude, scope, and scale of this security challenge cannot be understated.”

He’s right. China is producing 100 J-20 fighter aircraft annually, while the United States is turning out roughly 135 F-35s, with only 60 to 70 destined for our Air Force. As in shipbuilding, that’s a recipe for second place.

Beyond numbers, this is also about jobs, skills, and the myriad of companies that contribute to these extraordinary machines and the technology behind them. If we do not sustain American industry, we will lose it.

Gary Roughead is a former United States Navy officer who served as the 29th Chief of Naval Operations from 2007 to 2011. He previously served as Commander of the United States Fleet Forces Command from May 17 to September 29, 2007.

Responding to these emerging challenges will require the U.S. military to find ways to bolster its ranks. Fortunately, the country already has a powerful, if underutilized, recruitment tool at its disposal: tuition assistance.

Education benefits have long ranked among the primary reasons people join the military. They are also essential for ensuring our military members can succeed in civilian life, helping them secure strong careers while providing the country’s labor force with a steady pipeline of experienced and disciplined talent.

Fewer troops are using Tuition Assistance benefits

However, these benefits have struggled to keep pace with the evolving needs of service members. In recent years, the buying power of the military’s tuition assistance program has begun to rapidly diminish. Furthermore, a recent report from Rand Corp. found that military transition programs provide minimal support in helping service members and veterans actually translate their skills and experience to the labor market.

Higher education should be a crucial bridge between military service and civilian employment, yet many programs designed for service members and veterans are falling short. The United States has a moral obligation to support military members during and after their service. It also has a clear national security incentive to invest in the training and development of its service members.

Here are three ways the United States can enhance and modernize education benefits for military members.

Raise the cap on tuition assistance

While the Department of Defense’s Tuition Assistance program provides financial aid to active-duty service members, those funds are capped at $250 per credit hour and at $4,500 per year. Based on DOD data, if a service member were to rely solely on this program to pay for college, it would take them seven years to earn an associate’s degree. With many service members going to college with the goal of earning a credential that can quickly help them transition to a well-paying civilian career, that’s a delay very few can afford.

Astoundingly, the cap has remained unchanged for more than two decades. The same can’t be said for tuition and fees, which have dramatically risen over the same time frame, putting increasing financial strain on our service members and their families.

Tuition assistance programs mean very little if they do not provide enough funding for service members to complete their education and earn a credential of value in a timely fashion. It is long past time to revise the tuition assistance cap so that it reflects the true costs of higher education today.

Raise appropriations

Of course, the Defense Department cannot better fund tuition assistance and other education benefits for military members without a commensurate increase in its budget for such programs.

Congress demands answers on Army’s tuition assistance failure

Current levels of funding not only create challenges for military learners but the institutions serving them. With each passing year, participating in the tuition assistance program becomes less and less cost-effective for colleges and universities. A growing number of institutions are already opting out, citing their inability to sustain their support for active-duty service members with the resources currently available to them. Alarmingly, the Army is now reportedly considering potential cuts to its education benefits, following similar cuts made by military branches during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These measures have only hastened the decline of the program’s impact.

Lawmakers should act to secure additional funding to expand the Defense Department’s education benefits. With Congress currently weighing President Biden’s request for $850 billion in Defense Department spending for 2025, even a significant increase in appropriations for tuition assistance would constitute just a small fraction of the overall DOD budget.

At the same time, policymakers can work to tie those dollars to institutional outcomes, helping ensure that such funds not only open the door to education and training for service members but help create clear pathways to employment.

Raise awareness

There is a great need to build awareness not only about the necessity of improving military education benefits but also about the existence of such benefits in the first place.

A 2017 Rand study found that a surprising number of new recruits are unaware of the education benefits available to them, with less than a quarter being familiar with the tuition assistance program. Just 20% of service members currently use the benefit. As higher education leaders, military leaders and policymakers work to improve and modernize these programs, they should also ensure that more recruits and service members are informed of — and motivated by — the educational opportunities the military can provide.

Amid escalating global tensions and a challenging recruitment landscape, the United States will need to intensify its efforts to maintain a robust and capable military. Enhancing and modernizing education benefits represents an investment in both the individual futures of our service members and the long-term security of the nation.

Meg O’Grady is senior vice president of Military and Government Programs at National University. With 25-plus years of experience, Meg is a nationally recognized expert on creating employment, transition, education and outreach programs that engage the military community.

Under the leadership of Jens Stoltenberg, NATO embraced the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or CMC, in 2008, which barred 124 member nations from stockpiling, using or manufacturing these weapons due to their indiscriminate nature and long-term humanitarian impact.

But the grinding continuation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the largest European conflict since WWII, and the looming threat from a Russian and Chinese “friendship without limits” demands a strategic shift.

As such, NATO’s future effectiveness in deterring Russian aggression hinges on withdrawing from the treaty and resuming the production and deployment of cluster munitions.

The defense of Europe in the face of Russian aggression requires a pragmatic approach that balances moral obligations with strategic necessities. The CMC, while noble in intent, has proven to be a strategic liability.

It is incumbent upon NATO’s new leadership to correct this course, ensuring that the alliance remains capable of defending its member states against present and future threats. Withdrawing from the CMC and reinstating the use of cluster munitions is a difficult but necessary decision to strengthen NATO’s defense posture and secure peace in Europe.

Why the US is willing to send Ukraine cluster munitions now

It also makes little sense to remain part of a convention on arms control when future arms control deals are unlikely.

The CMC limits NATO capabilities while giving Russia time to build and maintain a defense industrial base that is already well ahead of Europe. The European defense industry has already struggled to produce conventional munitions and re-orienting toward cluster munition production too late could prove disastrous.

NATO under Stoltenberg has had two-and-a-half years of war in Ukraine to lead NATO out of the CMC debacle and suggest that all members withdraw.

However, Stoltenberg’s leading role in the inception of the CMC highlights the inherent contradiction between arms control and deterrence. Weakening NATO’s deterrence capabilities through adherence to the CMC potentially emboldens Russia by making Europe more vulnerable, risking greater loss of life in the event of conflict.

Stoltenberg’s tenure as NATO’s secretary general is marked by a significant contradiction. His role in founding the CMC was driven by humanitarian concerns, but as the leader of NATO, he is responsible for deterring Russian aggression.

At the 2008 CMC, Stoltenberg was quoted saying that “the treaty places moral obligations on all states not to use cluster munitions.” and “banning cluster bombs took too long. Too many people lost arms and legs.”

Despite the CMC’s push for other NATO members to join, European states under more direct threat from Russia — like Finland, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia — have refused to join the convention, leading to a bifurcated NATO.

Stoltenberg, despite his opposition to cluster munitions, has repeatedly suggested that Russia will not stop at Ukraine.

“I think there’s no doubt that President Putin is trying to re-establish a sphere of influence to ensure that Russia has control over neighbor countries,” he said at the Wilson Center in June.

The CMC, while morally driven, has inadvertently weakened NATO, and arguing for a limitation of defensive capabilities despite highlighting the Russia threat to neighboring NATO is contradictory.

The moral inconsistency of Stoltenberg’s role in the CMC and as NATO general secretary is palpable. An organization created to avoid war through deterrence has abdicated its responsibility to provide the best possible defense. Stoltenberg’s inability to reconcile these opposing roles has left NATO in a precarious position, with some member states, like Lithuania, taking independent action to withdraw from the CMC and bolster their defenses.

Putin says Russia has ‘sufficient stockpile’ of cluster bombs

Lithuania’s recent decision to withdraw from the CMC with a decisive parliamentary vote highlights the growing divide within NATO. Eastern European countries, acutely aware of the Russian threat, see the need for cluster munitions as a critical component of their defense strategy. In contrast, Western European nations remain bound by the CMC, creating a rift that undermines NATO’s unity and operational effectiveness. Stoltenberg’s departure and the ascension of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to lead the alliance offers a crucial opportunity for new leadership to address this divide and establish a cohesive policy.

So far, Rutte has offered no statements on cluster munitions, but to solve the scattered NATO policy on their use, he should take seriously the opinion of NATO nations on Russia’s border.

The Tactical Importance of Cluster Munitions

The practical application of cluster munitions in Ukraine has demonstrated their strategic value. Turkey’s provision of Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine proved pivotal in the Battle of Bakhmut, showcasing the lethal effectiveness of these weapons in multiple pivotal areas.

Cluster munitions can effectively cover large areas, making them ideal for targeting dispersed or moving troops and vehicles. Their dual-purpose nature allows them to be effective against a variety of targets, from light armor to personnel.

The United States approving cluster munitions transfers to Ukraine further underscores their necessity in modern warfare. The delay in providing these munitions due to political debates rooted in the CMC has cost lives and weakened Ukraine’s defense.

NATO members withdrawing from the CMC would not only unify the alliance’s stance but also send a clear signal to Russia regarding NATO’s resolve. The recent support for cluster munitions by Eastern European nations and the practical success observed in Ukraine provides a compelling case for this strategic shift.

Additionally, NATO must take a stand on cluster munitions as an organization, rather than Stoltenberg calling for “governments to decide, and not NATO as an alliance.” The mark of a great leader is the willingness to change positions at inflection points. The defense of Europe requires cluster munitions now, and in the future. This is not 2008.

The Role of China in the Geopolitical Landscape

Moreover, the evolving geopolitical landscape demands that NATO consider the broader implications of its defense strategies, particularly concerning China’s increasing relevance.

China’s strategic partnership with Russia, often described as a “friendship without limits,” has significant implications for NATO. This partnership extends beyond diplomatic support to tangible contributions to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. China has been accused of providing technology and economic aid that indirectly supports Russia’s military operations, thereby complicating the strategic calculations for NATO.

China’s stance on cluster munitions further underscores the need for NATO to reassess its position. China has refused to join the CMC, prioritizing its military capabilities over humanitarian concerns. This refusal allows China to maintain a robust arsenal that includes cluster munitions, which could potentially be used in future conflicts.

NATO must recognize that adhering to the CMC puts it at a strategic disadvantage not only against Russia but also against a rising China.

John Nagl is professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College.

Dan Rice is president of the American University of Kyiv and the co-president of Thayer Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

John and Dan are both Iraq War combat veterans. This article expresses their views and not those of the United States Army, the Army War College or the Department of Defense. The authors would like to thank Army War College senior intern David Heiner of the University of Denver for his help in the research and editing of this article.

The enduring conflicts in Ukraine, the Levant and Red Sea underscore the tumultuous nature of the global security environment. The United States’ adversaries and challengers are growing increasingly aligned in their efforts to undermine the international order and disrupt global stability. A coercive and aggressive Chinese Communist Party is militarizing at a wartime pace. The U.S. and our European allies face depleted arsenals while tensions in the Middle East continue to boil, increasing concerns that these challenges will require the joint force to make trade-offs between competing defense priorities. Herein lies the central defense challenge of today: ensuring the joint force has the requisite capabilities and capacity — the depth of magazine — to support U.S. allies and partners and sustain a protracted campaign of its own.

Depth matters

The depth of our nation’s magazine extends beyond ammunition storage and weapons. It encompasses our munitions, fuel and food stockpiles, and prepositioned inventories. It also includes the resiliency of our supply chains and the strength and depth of our industrial capacity. Additionally, it requires a deep bench of reserve and rotational forces that can relieve, reinforce and enable rapid reconstitution. Most importantly, it must effectively meet the needs of a short- and long-term time horizon.

While the joint force is postured to meet defense requirements now, the uncertainty of the future operating environment and the unpredictability of our adversaries heighten the risks associated with a shallow magazine. For example, an insufficient supply of aircraft, ammunition or aviators could limit our strike warfare operational tempo in the Indo-Pacific.

In the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian leadership failed to plan for the resources required to sustain their formations beyond the opening stages while limited inventories likely constrained the scope of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. While Ukraine registered an operational demand for 250,000 artillery rounds per month in the lead-up, they were limited to approximately 90,000 artillery rounds per month at the height of the counteroffensive.

Ukraine has recognized it cannot solely rely on allies and partners and is working to expand the capacity of its industrial base. These efforts are proving fruitful, particularly in drone production. The number of domestic drone manufacturers has grown from seven to over 300 within the last eighteen months to keep pace with the Ukrainian armed forces’ consumption of over 10,000 unmanned platforms per month. However, production capacity takes time.

The clear lesson here is that limited capacity could force the U.S. to limit the scope of its military objectives or operational force employment if it is determined that a long-duration, high-tempo campaign is unsustainable. Most importantly, it could undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrence and embolden our adversaries.

The short, sharp illusion

Cathal J. Nolan systematically examines the Second Punic War, the Hundred Years’ War, the War of Spanish Succession, the Napoleonic Wars and the world wars in his 2017 book, “The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost.” He underscores that great power warfare is a society-encompassing affair that uses the full extent of a nation’s industrial capacity and political will. Major wars are most often won by the state with greater long-term capability and capacity.

The myth of the short, sharp conflict does not reflect the historical record, nor does it serve as a prudent planning factor for future conflict. Regardless of theater, joint and coalition forces need a depth of magazine that can last years — not months. China is increasing its weapons inventory five to six times faster than the United States while building multilayered antiaccess, area-denial defenses. Any conflict with China would produce an insatiable appetite for resources.

Not easy work

During the recent NATO summit in Washington, D.C., NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the alliance has failed to keep up with the demands of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Whether hampered by policy, politics or production capacity, NATO is not matching Russia’s renewed wartime production. Building and maintaining a depth of magazine requires proactive decision-making.

Closer coordination and teaming between government, defense and commercial industry will be required to meaningfully accelerate and scale critical capabilities in areas where industry is clearly in the lead. The U.S. should pursue procurement solutions and block buys of exquisite weapons, platforms and munitions while leveraging allies’ and partners’ ability to manufacture high quantities of defense commodities to focus on the capabilities that will be needed in a future high-end, high-intensity conflict. Ultimately, depth of magazine, along with a strategy to win beyond the opening stages of a conflict, should be carefully planned for and initiated well prior to the onset of conflict. That time is now.

Mars must be fed

History tells us that great power conflict comes with a high likelihood of protraction. If the U.S. is to maintain a credible deterrent and prevent the outbreak of a protracted war, the U.S. and its allies and partners must have deep enough magazines to sustain military operations in a long, high-intensity conflict. An insufficient inventory risks limiting the operational tempo and scope of military objectives or undermining our ability to sustain a protracted conflict. Ultimately, the depth of our magazine will determine the credibility of U.S. deterrence and our ability to protect national security.

Gen. Christopher Mahoney is the assistant commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

In contemporary military operations, UAS are being tightly integrated into infantry tactics, used in new and creative ways for reconnaissance, leveraged for forward operating base defense, relied on to provide critical intelligence and deployed for data collection. Because UAS can autonomously operate in hazardous environments and undertake high-risk missions, they have revolutionized warfare by significantly enhancing operational safety and expanding tactical options for ground forces.

In response to China’s historical technological dominance in the UAS market and amid the technology’s rapid evolution, Congress has taken steps to foster technology development while addressing new potential dangers. Legislative measures have been introduced to support the development of domestic UAS capabilities.

H.R. 2864, the C-CCP Drone Act, would mandate the inclusion of equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (DJI Technologies), the world’s largest drone manufacturer, on the Federal Communications Commission’s list of equipment that poses a risk to U.S. national security.

The threat of Chinese advancements

DJI and Autel, both Chinese companies, control more than 90% of the global drone market. In the mid to late 2000s, subsidized pricing allowed DJI to penetrate global markets rapidly, including within the U.S. and NATO countries, to the detriment of domestic manufacturers.

The ubiquity and cost advantages of Chinese drones have disrupted foreign markets while introducing security vulnerabilities in sensitive areas such as critical infrastructure, military bases and urban surveillance. Reports have surfaced of data from Chinese-made drones being transmitted back to servers in China, raising concerns about espionage and data security. China’s collaboration with Russia to enhance Russian FPV drone production capabilities could also pose a further challenge to the U.S. and NATO.

US countermeasures and investment

In this environment, ensuring the West’s UAS superiority on the battlefield will depend on the success of efforts to bolster domestic capabilities, increase investments in R&D and develop advanced technologies that can compete with and surpass those produced by China.

The Department of Defense has initiated multiple programs to bolster U.S.-based UAS manufacturers and support the development of a secure and reliable supply chain for critical components.

Meanwhile, private companies like Anduril, Shield AI and Edge Autonomy are leading the charge with new UAS solutions tailored for defense applications. These innovators are not only developing cutting-edge technology but also ensuring their products are free from foreign influence and data security dangers by manufacturing critical components such as cameras, gimbals, flight controllers, and radios onshore.

Private equity can further these efforts by strategically investing in innovative companies and technologies, driving the growth of domestic UAS innovation. Moreover, by supporting these companies’ efforts to develop onshore manufacturing processes and establish secure supply chains, private equity investment can help reduce dependence on foreign sources and enhance national security.

It is therefore paramount to invest in developing and deploying critical technologies and cyber tools to the warfighter that will be necessary to accelerate domestic UAS development and deployment.

Doctrine, training and safety standards

While much is happening on the production front, we also need to consider the impact of UAS on military operations, which will require significant adjustments. Military doctrine will need to continue to evolve to include new tactics, techniques and procedures for UAS-supported fire and maneuver. Following special operations’ lead in this domain, new protocols will have to be rapidly transitioned to the conventional forces.

Training programs must also change to focus on the operational skills required to manage UAS fleets, interpret real-time data and integrate UAS intelligence into broader operational contexts. This training should include ethical considerations related to privacy violations and rules of engagement in settings where civilian populations are often at risk.

Outlook

Innovations in artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous operations are certain to further enhance UAS capabilities, making them more efficient and versatile. AI is poised to play a significant role in the future of UAS by enabling drones to perform complex tasks with minimal human intervention and adapt to dynamic combat environments, improving their ability to detect and respond to threats. Autonomous operations will reduce the burden on human operators, allowing for more efficient and effective mission execution.

Soon, we can also expect to see UAS with extended operational ranges, improved stealth features and advanced payload capabilities. Integrating UAS with other emerging technologies such as augmented reality and cyber warfare tools will also create new tactical opportunities and challenges.

The integration of UAS with AI will also give ground troops enhanced situational awareness, as well as better coordination and decision-making in the field. Likewise, cyber warfare tools will enable UAS to disrupt enemy communications and infrastructure, providing a strategic advantage in modern conflicts.

As UAS technology continues to evolve and domestic drone production expands, it is crucial for military and industry leaders to closely monitor threats while fostering an entrepreneurial environment that prioritizes continuous innovation, rigorous training and doctrinal adaptation. Through collaboration, the potential of UAS can be fully realized, ensuring that military operations are as effective and efficient as possible while minimizing risks to combatants and civilians.

Florent Groberg is a vice president at AE Industrial within the firm’s Portfolio Strategy and Optimization Group. Groberg previously held key positions at Microsoft, Boeing and LinkedIn. Prior to that, Groberg was a captain in the U.S. Army, completing both U.S. Army Airborne and U.S. Army Ranger schools. Groberg received the Medal of Honor for his actions in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2012. He currently serves on the American Battle Monuments Commission, an appointment by the president of the United States.

My husband served in the Navy for 20 years, where he specialized in disarming explosive devices, and his best friend was among those 31.

Most of my husband’s career was spent attached to Navy SEAL Team 2 and Navy SEAL Team 6, where he bravely carried out more than 12 combat deployments.

We were a tight community, and on that day in August, 31 of our friends and teammates lost their lives in an instant.

My husband had the harrowing task of notifying his best friend’s wife and children of his death and bringing his remains back to West Virginia.

We were never the same.

Psychedelic therapy data ‘speaks for itself,’ VA official says

After this mass casualty, we lost many others, either in combat, in training, or to suicide. I became depressed and constantly anxious that the ball was going to drop, and that my family would be the next to receive that dreaded knock on the door. I began having panic attacks and suicidal thoughts.

I was convinced no one gets out unscathed, and if you want the truth, no one really does.

A few years later, my husband retired with a 100% disability rating at just 39 years old, primarily due to invisible wounds—those deep-seated mental scars that no medal could ever begin to mend.

In the quiet desperation that often accompanies military service, both veterans and their families bear a weight that is rarely understood by those outside the fold. As a military spouse, I’ve witnessed firsthand the toll that years of service can take on the mind and spirit of those who have served our country. For years, our family navigated the turbulent waters of post-service life, where the aftershocks of trauma reverberated through our daily existence.

Both my husband and I have tried a range of therapies to heal. A decade after the accident, in July 2021, I was introduced to midomafetamine assisted therapy on a life-changing retreat to Mexico.

This treatment involves a drug known as MDMA, or on the street as ecstasy or Molly. I was invited along with six other special operation spouses to explore this treatment solution, since it has yet to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the U.S. It turned out to be a beacon of hope for healing deep-seated emotional wounds.

In a therapeutic setting, MDMA allows those suffering to access buried demons and trauma in a way that is gentle and compassionate—something traditional therapies often struggle to achieve. It’s not about escaping reality but confronting it head-on, under the guidance of trained therapists in a safe and supportive environment.

In 2017, the FDA designated MDMA-assisted therapy, as a “breakthrough therapy” because of clinically demonstrated evidence in treating the root causes of PTSD. In one example, a study found that following just three sessions of MDMA therapy, 71% of participants no longer met the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD.

Our veterans need access to this treatment, but without FDA approval, it often remains out of reach. Veterans like my husband, for example, who work in government jobs after military retirement, are given strict polygraphs that specifically ask if the employee has ever taken a schedule I drug like MDMA. Without FDA approval of MDMA therapy, they cannot seek out this route without risking their security clearance.

One of the most profound challenges my husband has faced, which is common among veterans, is that his nervous system has become locked in a perpetual state of shutdown and detachment. This manifests as extreme fatigue, emotional numbness, and disconnection from both himself and loved ones.

I vividly recall a moment at my son’s hockey game. He scored a goal, the crowd cheered, and my husband dutifully clapped and smiled. Later that night, he said to me: “I go through the motions of happiness and excitement, but I feel nothing.” It was a stark reminder of the invisible battle raging within him, one that no amount of conventional therapy seemed able to reach.

Psychedelics may soon be available — sort of — to treat vets with PTSD

The FDA has not approved a new treatment for PTSD in nearly 25 years, leaving those suffering with antidepressant drugs a as approved treatments, medications that only seem to numb the pain. This keeps some people at a baseline of numbness—while they may not feel all the bad, they often struggle to feel joy.

Our veterans are experiencing a suicide epidemic, in part because they cannot access the care they need. Every day, an estimated 17 or more veterans die by suicide, totaling up to 16,000 veterans each year.

For veterans in particular, MDMA therapy provides clarity and allows them to uncover profound empathy and forgiveness for themselves—directly addressing guilt for leaving their families or painful experiences during war. It saves their lives.

Yet, despite its promising results, an FDA Advisory Committee recently declined to recommend MDMA as a treatment for PTSD, cherry picking small procedural concerns. The FDA will make its final decision on whether to approve MDMA for such therapy on August 11.

I strongly urge them to help veterans who are suffering and approve this lifesaving therapy.

The same veterans who risked everything for our country are being denied access to treatments that could offer them a chance at peace. Our veterans should not need to go abroad, or worse, seek this therapy in an unregulated environment within the U.S. It’s a cruel irony that those who sacrificed so much are often left to navigate their post-service lives with inadequate support for their mental health.

Veterans deserve every opportunity to heal, to reconnect with themselves and their families, and to reclaim the lives they put on hold in service to our nation. Denying them access to breakthrough therapies is not just a disservice; it’s a betrayal of the promises we made as a grateful nation. We deserve the right to try any and all options, treatments, and healing modalities available to recover, repair, and improve our lives after years of sacrifice.

We must give our veterans the chance to rewrite their stories, not as victims of war but as resilient survivors who deserve every chance to live full lives.

Elaine Brewer is a proud military wife. She is the founder of Humble Warrior, a 501c3 nonprofit, which aids in military and first responder mental health and wellness. Elaine lives with her husband and their two sons in St. Louis, Missouri.

These systems bring with them the prospect of new technologies, new operational designs and, potentially, new business models. A key question for the Navy is how to signal to industry that the service has a thoughtful plan for the vast private sector investments needed to enable this transition, not to stifle innovation, but to avoid a feeding frenzy that the Navy cannot channel to best effect. One of the clearest needs for guardrails comes with how the Navy will execute command and control (C2) over the data, platforms, and networks that will underpin an ever larger and more lethal robotic fleet. As industry sees dollar signs at the dawn of robotic warfare, the Navy must consider whether it wants C2 to become a commercial offering before it finds itself having done so by accident. It may well be on that path already.

Three examples, from the sea to space, illustrate the Navy’s experimentation with partially privatized command and control, with attendant benefits and risks. Furthest downstream, Saildrone has taken a pole position in waterfront experimentation at FIFTH and FOURTH fleets in part because of a contractor-owned, contractor-operated model that enabled quicker and cheaper iteration. What the company’s website calls “mission-as-a-service” is effectively maritime domain awareness (MDA) for sale — the Navy buys the data stream coming off a vessel while the business operates the platform itself. This model has been invaluable as a route to fast testing on the water, though it has limitations, not least given companies’ likely opposition to sending company-owned vessels into high threat environments (e.g., the Red Sea or Black Sea today, maybe the South China Sea tomorrow). MDA for sale has helped the Navy move at speed, but it is unlikely to serve as an enduring model to achieve scale considering the Service is in the business of putting expensive platforms in harms way.

Midstream, Andruil offers an example of where some of the greatest potential uncaptured value is in the unfurling realm of mass distribution of robotic platforms at sea. As any Silicon Valley firm will tell you, selling hardware is good, but selling the digital rails on which those systems operate is better. Andruil’s Lattice architecture is one such example of an attempt to own the rails, or at least some of them. Advertised as “sensor, network, and system agnostic,” Lattice is an aspiring common architecture to enable large-scale robotic autonomy, something the Navy will surely need as it deploys hundreds of small systems. As with any software, the question for the Navy will be how much customization it can access, how quickly it can adapt underlying data, and how well it understands the algorithms that will translate commander’s intent into lethal autonomous actions. There is also a natural tension here — the more control industry has over the data, the more value it can extract. The Department of Defense has been here before, as with the debate over proprietary data rights surrounding the F-35.

Furthest upstream, we can see in Starlink another case of commercial value and commercial risks. DoD has announced a military version of the satellite internet service (Starshield) and the Navy is reportedly working with SpaceX on shipboard Starlink terminals. We have seen the potent efficacy of such systems in Ukraine, as well as the potential operational limitations that privatized networks can impose on missions that may jeopardize business (or personal) interests. Starlink is also a good example of a defense application derived from a non-defense service, which enables the Navy and DoD to shoulder less of the development burden. That matters greatly when you consider the relative collapse of defense R&D spending, down from 36% of global research dollars in 1960 to around 3% now. Where the U.S. defense sector was the engine of innovation in the Cold War, it is private industry today, and most often in search of commercial uses. Where the Navy can find common cause with commercial providers, it can ride on the coattails of an R&D enterprise that no longer orbits around the national security apparatus — though at a different kind of cost.

Individually, these efforts are technologically interesting and operationally significant. Collectively, they represent a potentially seismic shift in how the Navy thinks about command and control. This is neither “good” nor “bad.” The question at hand is whether a collective move towards a constellation of commercial C2 services, from deployed data streams to space-based networks, is strategic in design, or whether the Navy is inadvertently backing itself into C2 as a service. Intentionality is the core question, because the only way to manage risks associated with a commercialized C2 model is to know you are heading in that direction.

To date, the scale of naval uncrewed systems employment simply has not forced this conversation, or the associated business opportunities. In the air, the Navy fields MQ-4C Triton for aerial reconnaissance and MQ-8C Fire Scout for surface search and attack, but the numbers are relatively small and never constitute autonomous swarms beyond the span of human control. In other domains, the Navy has experimented for years with a small number of larger systems. On the surface, DARPA-initiated Sea Hunter is the latest in a line of experimental uncrewed surface vessels. It is joined by a modest family of larger uncrewed surface vessels pioneered by OSD’s Strategic Capabilities Office under the moniker of Ghost Fleet Overlord. Undersea, the Orca extra-large undersea vessel is inching towards fielding, and DARPA recently completed testing on a large design called Manta Ray.

What is new, as exemplified by Replicator, is a dash towards fielding thousands of smaller systems as a hedge against China and (ideally) as a bridge while the Navy pivots towards a more distributed and sustainable hybrid fleet design. As a result, the question of who owns C2 will only become more pressing. For industry, C2 as a service is novel, operationally valuable in the near-term, and theoretically lucrative in the long-term. For the Navy, the near-term attraction of outsourcing sensing, maneuvering, and networking to field more uncrewed systems faster must be balanced by the risks of entrenching a privatized C2 structure in an increasingly lethal architecture without a bigger plan. C2 as a service has some novel attributes, but it is not without its perils.

Joshua Tallis is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and the author of The War for Muddy Waters. From 2021-2023 he was the CNA advisor to the Sixth Fleet commander. His views are his own and do not represent those of CNA or the U.S. Navy.

Such issues threaten not only their current military readiness, but their ability to age in a healthy way, with a study released last fall revealing that nearly 70 percent of U.S. service members are within the overweight or obese ranges of the body mass index.

A previous research study enrolling active duty service members who were seeking assistance with weight management offers a case in point: A young male participant was at risk for early discharge from the military for exceeding body fat standards. He lacked a professional appearance in uniform and was unable to keep up on unit physical training.

When told that he had strong bones after a research study bone density scan, he had his platoon sergeant accompany him to the research office so we could explain that he had “big bones” which accounted for his large body mass.

Unfortunately, we could not support that justification and he was ultimately discharged after failing to drop any body fat mass over the 12-week counseling period of the study. He had come to terms with his situation, saying his hometown police force had a position waiting for him. It is unlikely he would be able to meet the physical requirements for that position either.

Nearly 70% of active service members are overweight, report finds

This is one of many stories demonstrating the consequences for an overweight or obese service member. In a relatively short period of time, he or she may be discharged without future job prospects, possibly having experienced a recent physical activity-limiting injury, and a health status involving abnormal lipid levels and elevated blood pressure, conditions requiring medical oversight.

A service member being overweight impacts their ability to contribute to their respective unit’s mission. Statistics that reveal a continuing, alarming climb in rates of overweight and obesity in children and adults in America apply to America’s troops as well.

Obesity almost doubled from 22% to 42% in U.S. adults between 1988 and 2020. Active component Army statistics show a current rate of obesity of 20%, with overweight soldiers comprising approximately 40% to 50% of the force.

Therefore, we must be agile, resourceful and innovative in our approach to a service member’s overall health, while encouraging leadership across every unit to engage on this issue. More must be done.

As health care professionals and scientists, we see real-time consequences of neglected health in our clinics and research populations every single day.

Health promotion research conducted by my team and others has incorporated strategies involving everything from DNA-based counseling to activity trackers to raise awareness and educate troops about how bad food choices affect their body composition, blood pressure and vitamin levels.

When troops neglect their fitness, they increase their chance of suffering an injury that will take longer to recover from, as well as potential pain and a loss to their unit. An unhealthy formation is a combat ineffective formation; the lethality of our military is at risk by this pervasive health epidemic.

Pandemic pounds push 10,000 Army soldiers into obesity

In a time of a military-wide recruiting crisis, we cannot afford to lose trained, but physically unfit, troops because they are unable to do their military jobs, becoming candidates for early discharge in the process.

A common myth is that all service members have statures like elite athletes who have 24/7 access to optimal nutrition, physical training resources, and coaching, but this is not true for a large population of our ranks.

But due to diverse garrison environments, training demands, and limited access to high quality nutrition, American troops exhibit a wide range of fitness and health literacy.

The solution must be a multi-pronged approach by leaders to apply evidence-based recommendations and translate research findings to create a culture of health in all military environments.

Dip, Doritos and drinking: Why the Army can’t get in shape

The following are some steps we believe unit commanders can take to counter this crisis:

- Leaders must educate themselves and their subordinates. Engage in conversations about safe and healthy lifestyle behaviors, including diet, sleep, and physical activity.

- Leaders must set the example. They should visit their dining facilities, promote a performance-focused food environment and policies that allow sufficient time for meals, while continually assessing unit dining options and encouraging input from their troops regarding nutritious meals, snacks, and beverages in garrison.

- Leaders must monitor unit data regarding musculoskeletal injuries, sleep, and nutrition and hydration metrics. Holistic Health and Fitness, or H2F, teams have demonstrated impressive results in support of readiness. Seek out and support what H2F teams can do for your command.

- Leaders should support research opportunities available to the unit that advance the science of nutrition, exercise, and sleep in military populations. With the help of the H2F Team of researchers, the Military Nutrition Environment Assessment Tool (m-NEAT) can be used to assess the military food environment, promote a culture of health and boost community alignment to address food architecture in convenience marts, commissaries and exchanges, while strengthening healthy lifestyle practices messaging to the ranks.

- Leaders should re-evaluate health risk assessment intervals. Height, weight, waist and hip circumference and blood pressure are low burden, reliable, and evidence-based measures of cardiovascular risk and can be performed by unit medics.

- Finally, leaders should take care of themselves. A fit CO shows that you value your own health and wellness, which will help you lead from the front and be the best leader you can be.

The military should also continue to explore making anti-obesity medications available to service members, particularly for those who don’t respond to traditional paths.

Since 2023, an Army service-specific policy allows the use of FDA-approved prescription anti-obesity medications for soldiers who are supervised by a provider in a treatment facility under operational control of the Defense Health Agency.

Service members deserve this consideration when such medications are accompanied by comprehensive lifestyle interventions and engaged leadership.

Taken together, these actions may reduce chronic disease risk, promote physical and mental health, and restore the injured service member to a fit and ready state.

Mary McCarthy is a senior nurse scientist with the Defense Health Agency’s Center for Nursing Science & Clinical Inquiry at the Madigan Army Medical Center.

Lt. Col. Tanisha Currie is deputy chief for nursing science and clinical inquiry, and senior advisor to the Joint Forces Leadership Council at Brooke Army Medical Center.

Capt. Kevin M. Kilroy is a physician’s assistant at Okubo Clinic at Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

The journalists reported seeing nothing wrong on the flight deck, which was precisely the point of Hill’s invitation. Ike and its crew remained on station, with no hole in the deck.

Two weeks earlier, a spokesman for Yemen’s Houthi rebel movement announced that the rebels had struck the Eisenhower with a barrage of missiles to punish the United States for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas.

On X (formerly Twitter), Houthi supporters shared a video allegedly showing a large crater at the forward end of the Eisenhower’s flight deck. Other accounts posted a different image of a fiery blast aboard the ship.

The purported evidence of a strike spread quickly across Chinese and Russian social media platforms, thanks in part to the efforts of Russian sites with a reputation in the West for spreading disinformation.

Despite false Houthi claims, the Ike aircraft carrier fights on

The Houthis’ online conjuring of a successful attack on Ike that never happened complements their months-long campaign to disrupt commercial shipping in the Red Sea that has sunk commercial vessels and injured civilian mariners.

And while the U.S. military and allies regularly hit back with airstrikes against Houthi missile launchers and other assets in Yemen, the Pentagon is less prepared to defend against the online lies and disinformation that the Houthis are spreading.

In the instance of the false Ike attack, Capt. Hill took matters into his own hands, leveraging his 86,000 followers on X. The day after the false claims emerged, Hill began to post videos and still images showing normal operations aboard his ship, including a plane landing on the flight deck and trays of muffins and cinnamon buns fresh from the oven in the ship’s bakery.

I infiltrated the bake shop because I smelled something interesting from way down the p-way. pic.twitter.com/8BkWFdI5LU

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) May 31, 2024

Meanwhile, independent analysts exposed how the Houthis generated their false evidence of a missile strike on the Eisenhower.

An Israeli analyst demonstrated that the supposed photograph of a crater on the carrier’s flight deck consisted of a stock image of a hole superimposed on an overhead shot of the Eisenhower taken from satellite imagery dated almost a year before the alleged strike.

This is a photoshopped satellite image of the USS Eisenhower docked at Pier 12 at the Naval Station Norfolk in Virginia, taken on April 10th, 2023.
Additionally, here is the Shutterstock image used for the "impact". https://t.co/CWagV062Xl pic.twitter.com/eqYsb04WVM

— Tal Hagin (@talhagin) June 4, 2024

The fictional attack on Ike did not come as a surprise to anyone tracking Houthi disinformation efforts. In an ironic example from March, a Telegram channel and a pro-Houthi website shared an AI-generated image of a burning vessel they identified as the Pinocchio, an actual commercial ship the Houthis had targeted but missed.

The Houthis’ supporters had pulled their supposed evidence from a website that shared free stock images. However, no one from the Pentagon officially debunked this image as the Israeli analyst did for the fake photos of Ike.

In addition to these forgeries, pro-Houthi accounts have posted actual images of commercial vessels in flames, claiming the destruction resulted from Houthi attacks.

Yet in those cases, one image showed a burning ship on the Black Sea while another showed events that took place off the coast of Sri Lanka. Pro-Houthi posters even attempted to portray a blurry photo of a distant volcano as a successful strike on an Israeli ship.

This deluge of deceptively labeled images spread was also met with crickets from the Pentagon.

The U.S. military appears to grasp the need to counter disinformation spread by the Houthis and other regional adversaries. In February, the Joint Maritime Information Center, or JMIC, launched its efforts to provide accurate information to shipping companies about Houthi strikes, both real and imagined.

The JMIC operates under the umbrella of the Combined Maritime Forces – a naval partnership of 44 nations under the command of the top U.S. admiral in the region, who also serves as commander of U.S. 5th Fleet.

This is a start, but the Navy has yet to show that it can debunk false information as quickly as the Houthis post it online.

It is fortunate that an Israeli civilian had the skill and commitment necessary to expose the alleged crater aboard the Eisenhower as a work of photoshopping. He posted his conclusions on X four days after the Houthis publicized the supposed attack. Ideally, the Navy itself should be prepared to debunk such propaganda as soon as it appears.

Standing up this kind of capability should be a priority for the JMIC, which could include such efforts in its existing weekly updates.

It is important to act now before the Houthis’ disinformation apparatus becomes more sophisticated. Already, one of its supporters’ fake images of a burning ship garnered 850,000 views on X.

Moreover, the challenge is not limited to the Red Sea or the Middle East. Military forces in every command should have public affairs and open-source intelligence personnel working together to debunk false and exaggerated claims of enemy success on the battlefield.

Max Lesser is senior analyst on emerging threats at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a non-profit, non-partisan think tank.